I recently got the chance to examine FBI Miami Firefight by Ed and Liz Mireles. Previously covered by Tiger McKee in Skill Set, (August 9th), it’s a book not just about the “FBI Miami Disaster” but a book that details much of the run-up to the fight and the aftermath in what has likely become the best documented, most thoroughly analyzed and least understood event in police history.

Failing to learn from the past is an all-too-typical feature of defensive firearms training – inside government service and outside. It demonstrates thoughtlessness for the sacrifice of those killed and injured to teach us those lessons.

Likewise, reaching snap judgements or parroting talking points from thin analyses shows ignorance. Better to examine the case with as much clarity as you can muster. One way to do this is to listen to someone who was there – and that’s what with get to do with FBI Miami Firefight.

Like battles generally, small elements combine to create great effect; SA Mireles referred to them as “falling dominoes” – cascading coincidental issues contributing to the impact of the situation; the opposite of ‘force multipliers.’

It seemed like lessons learned were relearned that day – and forgotten since -- making this book not only one for the ages, but very timely. The targets were stone killer armed robbery suspects: particularly brutal and, as it turned out, involved in murder. Well-armed, they seemed fearless. As to dominoes, a few things stand out.

- - Mireles says didn’t put on his armor at the outset of the day, putting it off to do later. He did have the shotgun available, but one of those closely involved only checked for his fowling piece after units deployed for surveillance and ‘patrol.’

The four guns in orange were with the offenders. The surrounding guns in blue were with FBI -- though nearly all of the long guns were inaccessible when the balloon went up. Photo: Ed Mireles.

- - Vehicular operations: “Did you notice anything about those guys, Val?” says Porter (Mel Gibson in Payback). “They weren’t wearing their seatbelts.” That made a real difference during the “bumper car rally” in advance of the shootout. One agent had drawn his gun in anticipation of a high-risk car stop, tucking it under his leg. In the resulting tumult, the gun flew free and he got to enjoy the battle effectively unarmed . . . he had no second gun. Further, an agent who needed his corrective eyewear lost them in the collision – and ended up “fighting blind.”

- - Firearms accessibility: Mireles had to cover an open space under fire because his shotgun was only loaded with 00B; he was more than fifty yards away at the opening of the ball and this ammo is ineffective at fifty yards – and, as it turned out, only marginally effective closer up. The people with more enhanced firepower – an MP5 (debatably a large, quick-firing pistol) and an M16 – were out of their cars away from radio contact when the “debate” started.

- - “Physiopsychological” aspects (hat tip to Massad Ayoob for the term): the sidearms were obvious when they fired as there was little noise, but the enormous blast of the .223 rifle used by the opposition broke through the haze of battle. That’s demoralizing. Consider the “wake turbulence” of bullets passing by you; that’s real and it’s perceived as the projectile breaks the speed of sound adding that unique sound. You don’t want to experience that the first time during the fight.

- - The horror of being hit – and discovering that – while the fight is roaring around you . . . from Ed Mireles: “I expected to see my left arm, maybe scraped up, but my arm nonetheless. Instead, I saw what looked to me like road kill. It was psychologically devastating and paralyzing.” Moments before he’d seen fellow agent Gordon McNeill take a gunshot to his gun hand while engaging the enemy. He reacted violently – but did not drop the gun – supporting the gun and hand with his non-dominant hand. He was greatly impressed by this though he might not have been conscious of that at the moment.

- - Coincidence: As Mireles was running to McNeill’s position, he apparently raised his Remington Model 870 to avoid covering the other agent with the muzzle. Doing so caused his left arm to shield his chest from the incoming .223 round. It demolished his arm – and took him out of the fight only momentarily. The round didn’t reach his heart . . .

- - The infamous bullet: “The bullet was a 9mm 115 grain, silver tip, hollow-point round. This shot and bullet would become the center of a lot of speculation, research, and some controversy in the future, and it would forever change law enforcement ballistics. The bullet hit Platt on the lower part of his right bicep, traversed up into his arm, and severed the brachial artery and nerve in his bicep. It did not hit any bone and exited Platt’s arm, continuing to travel up and hit the right side of Platt’s chest where it penetrated his right lung. The bullet traversed through the lung and stopped an inch or two short of his heart . . . when Platt chose to continue to fight instead of giving up, he sealed his fate and the fates of several FBI agents.” It was called a ‘nonsurvivable hit,’ one that he could have received while attending a topflight trauma center and never have a chance of survival -- yet he continued to fight.

Liz and Ed Mireles -- the aftermath was pocked with multiple surgeries and post-traumatic event trauma. This is every bit as much of the story as the event and is critical information for anyone involved in defensive use of firearms. Ed Mireles photo.

- - The longest time: Best guess is that shots were fired at 9:35 AM. The fight ended at 9:40 AM. During that time, an estimated 140-150 rounds were fired (some brass was doubtless lost due to med-evac helo prop blast), nine of ten active participants received gunshot injuries, four died and three of six survivors “were terribly wounded and would be disabled for (life).”

“Before he died, Platt had been shot and wounded twelve times. His partner Matix had been shot six times. Toxicology showed that their systems were clean, no drugs or narcotics of any kind.”

Conclusions: Lots of small things contributed to the disaster in Miami. At that, it could have been worse. The sole thing that kept it from simply being a massacre was the fighting spirit of agents of the FBI. A lot is made of ‘ammunition failure’: “To repeat, bullet size does matter when trying to stop a large land mammal like a human being.”

Actually, there’s no data supporting a conclusion that a bullet that penetrated enough to strike Platt’s heart would have stopped the carnage: LAPD Officer Stacey Lim was shot through the heart at close range by a gangbanger/carjacker armed with a .357 Magnum revolver. The bullet struck her heart, exiting through her back. She responded by running her assailant down and killing him.  Consider this though: like Ed Mireles, Officer Lim’s response was to ‘take the war to the enemy.’ While you may not survive – SA Mireles reports feeling the pre-death euphoria of the grievously injured – he grimly determined to take the offenders who murdered his team mates along with him.

And Ed did survive – and contribute to our understanding of psychological and physiological effects of violent events as well as affirming that we need to carry on to the objective.

As to approach tactics – it was a problem, but it was hand they were dealt. These offenders had already killed – as well as shot one left for dead that gave the first real description of the robbers. Yeah, it would have been nice to wait for more, but it had to stop somewhere.

And it could have been so much worse.

- - Rich Grassi